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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Facially Insufficient Affidavit
Warrants for arrest or search are issued after an exparte hearing
at which a magistrate ordinarily receives an affidavit rather than oral
testimony.' To be sufficient, the affidavit must establish probable
cause in accordance with the criteria announced in a series of less-
than-consistent Supreme Court cases.2 A noncomplying affidavit is,
of course, facially insufficient, and the magistrate should deny the
request for a warrant. In some cases, however, the magistrate will
erroneously issue a warrant on a facially insufficient affidavit2 For-
tunately, his decision is not final. If the search is fruitful, the defen-
dant will be permitted, at a hearing on a motion to suppress, to argue
that the affidavit was facially insufficient and that the magistrate
erroneously issued the warrant.' The suppression hearing, therefore,
is the post-issuance procedure for dealing with a facially insufficient
affidavit.
B. The Facially Sufficient Affidavit
Suppose that an informant tells a police officer that, after being
invited into the defendant's home, he was shown a large quantity of
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
While this article was awaiting publication, the decision in United States ex rel. Petillo v.
New Jersey, 400 F. Supp 1152 (D. N.J. 1975), was announced. More than any other case,
Petillo comes to grips with many of the issues to which this article is addressed. Of particular
interest is the holding that, at a hearing on a motion to suppress, it may be constitutionally
necessary for the state to disclose the identity of an informant whose information led to the
issuance of a warrant. 400 F. Supp. at 1166-67 n. 8; see note 11l, infra.
It should be noted that the decision in Petillo granted habeas corpus relief to the defendant
in State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 293 A. 2d 649 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973). The
state case is cited infra at notes 1I, 15, 36 and 37.
I Note, Testing the Factual Basisfor a Search Warrant, 67 CoLUti. L. REV. 1529 (1967);
Comment, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit: What if it's False?, 19
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 96, 97-98 (1971).
2 See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
E.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
' See cases cited supra note 2.
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heroin by the defendant. The officer knows that the informant is an
addict who can recognize heroin, but he does not know whether the
informant is telling the truth. The informant has not previously given
information to the police and therefore has no record of reliability.
Were the officer to disclose all of the facts in an affidavit, it would
be facially insufficient. If an affidavit is based on the statement of an
informant, it must contain some of the circumstances that underlie
the affiant's belief in the informant's credibility. In the present case,
no such circumstance exists. Recognizing this deficiency, the officer
drafts a false affidavit. He asserts that the informant had previously
given information that led to the arrest and conviction of persons for
possessing heroin. The affidavit is now facially sufficient, and the
magistrate is deceived. In good faith, he issues the warrant. A search
is made, heroin is seized, and the defendant is charged with posses-
sion. A motion to suppress is filed, and a hearing is held. At the
hearing, the defense lawyer admits that the affidavit is facially suffi-
cient. He seeks, however, to make a sub-facial attack, claiming a
right to examine the affiant to prove the falsity of the affidavit. 5
Consideration of such a claim at a suppression hearing is not
explicitly required by any decision of the United States Supreme
Court. Although the Court has occasionally assumed the propriety
of a sub-facial attack,' it has, despite the urging of commentators7
and even several of the Justices,' consistently refused to resolve the
issue, letting it go by default to other decision makers. In some
jurisdictions, the claim will routinely be considered by the judge who
presides at the suppression hearing; in others, it will be considered
only under limited circumstances; in still others, it will not be consid-
ered at all.9 Whether, for reasons of fourth amendment magnitude,
it ought to be considered is the subject of this article.
5 The hypothetical case is based on United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322 (10th Cir.
1972).
1 Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532 (1964).
7 Forkosh, The Constitutional Right to Challenge the Content of Affidavits in Warrants
Issued Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 297, 298-99 (1973); Kipperman.
Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 825 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Kipperman].
1 North Carolina v. Wrenn, 417 U.S. 973 (1974) (Justice White and Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
' For a collection of cases, see id. For collections and analyses, see sources cited supra
notes I and 7. Additionally, see Mascolo, Impeaching the Credibility of Affidavits for Search
Warrants: Piercing the Presumption of Validity, 44 CONN. B. J. 9 (1970); 15 BUFv. L. REV.
712 (1966); 51 CORN. L. Q. 822 (1966); 34 FORD L. REV. 740 (1966); 8 IND. L. REV. 738 (1975).
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II. COMMONLY ADVANCED ARGUMENTS FOR PROHIBITING ANY
SUB-FACIAL ATTACK AT A SUPPRESSION HEARING
The cases prohibiting any sub-facial attack at a suppression
hearing rest on a mind-boggling array of arguments. A commentator
has described some of them as flimsy,10 but the description was un-
doubtedly born of a surfeit of charity. In fact, none of the arguments
will withstand scrutiny.
One of the oft-repeated arguments is that the warrant-issuing
process so adequately protects fourth amendment values that review
at a suppression hearing is unnecessary. The meaning of this argu-
ment is not clear. If it is an assertion that magistrates routinely or
even frequently seek information beyond the face of the affidavit, it
is, as a matter of fact, simply insupportable. Although a magistrate
who doubts the accuracy of an affidavit does have the legal authority
to examine the affiant and others under oath, 2 there is no evidence
that the authority is used to any considerable extent when the affida-
vit is facially sufficient.' 3 A proceeding for the issuance of a warrant
is ex parte. No defense advocate is present even to suggest the desira-
bility of a sub-facial inquiry. The proceeding is marked by haste, and
it is not unheard of for the magistrate to be a "sweetheart"-one
whose pro-police bias is well known and to whom the police regularly
resort for warrants. 4 The warrant-issuing process is barely adequate
to screen out affidavits that are insufficient on their face. It is, there-
fore, fatuous to argue that it functions adequately to unearth sub-
facial defects when the affidavit is facially sufficient.
The second argument for prohibiting sub-facial attacks at a sup-
pression hearing is a counterpart to the first. It is that the law of
perjury so adequately protects against the submission of false infor-
mation to the issuing magistrate that review at a suppression hearing
is unnecessary. 5 This argument fails in a number of respects. Search
warrant affidavits frequently recount the observations not only of the
affiant but of an informant who has given information to the affiant.
If it is the informant who is the source of false information, the law
,0 Note, supra note 1, at 1530.
" State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 174, 293 A.2d 649, 653 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945
(1973). See People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 144, 258 N.E.2d 341, 343, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882
(1970).
11 E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c), 41(c).
,3 Comment, supra note 1, at 110.
, L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 120 (1967).
'5 Note, supra note 1, at 1530. See People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 144, 258 N.E. 2d 341,
343, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970); State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 174, 293 A.2d 649, 653
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973).
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of perjury is unavailing because the informant has not given informa-
tion under oath, as the law of perjury requires."6 If, however, it is the
affiant who has given false information, the requirement of an oath
is met, but other problems remain. A highly subjective mens
rea-knowledge of falsity-is an essential element of perjury. 7 A
lesser mental state will not suffice. Hence, if the affiant has recklessly
or negligently misrepresented the truth, the law of perjury is inapplic-
able and can hardly be regarded as a deterrent. More importantly,
even if the affiant knows the information is false, the law of perjury
will not deter him from submitting it unless he believes that his
veracity might be challenged. Viewing the process realistically, the
only person who has an interest in challenging the affiant is the
defendant. Neither the issuing magistrate nor the prosecutor is likely
to do so.' 8 If the defendant is prohibited from challenging the affiant's
veracity, it will go unquestioned, and whatever deterrent effect the
law of perjury might have had will be minimized to the point of
negligibility. To deny a sub-facial attack by arguing that the law of
perjury adequately guards against false affidavits is, therefore, noth-
ing more than a judicial version of "Catch-22."
The third and fourth arguments for prohibiting sub-facial at-
tacks at a suppression hearing are somewhat related. They are that
using the suppression hearing as a vehicle for inquiring into sub-facial
sufficiency would destroy the solemnity of the warrant-issuing pro-
cess 6 and that it would result in the unseemly spectacle of one judge
reviewing the decision of another. 0 Each argument is ludicrous. The
decision to issue a warrant is, at very best, no more solemn than any
other judicial decision. Indeed, because the proceeding is often hasty
and always ex parte, it is likely to be less solemn than many other
decisions that are reviewable. Moreover, an issuing magistrate sel-
dom inquires into the truth of a facially sufficient affidavit.21 Conse-
quently, it is inaccurate to treat a sub-facial attack at a suppression
hearing as a review of the issuing magistrate's decision. Rather, it is
an inquiry of first instance. Finally, the defendant is permitted, at a
suppression hearing, to attack the facial sufficiency of the affidavit
t R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 454, 456, 458-60 (2d ed. 1969).
t' Id. at 460; MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) (1962).
'8 Comment, supra note 1, at 110, 113-14. The question under consideration is analogous
to the question of the efficacy of alternatives to the exclusionary rule. These alternatives have
been characterized as "pie in the sky." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 429 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam].
ig Note, supra note 1, at 1530.
10 Id.
21 Comment, supra note 1, at 110.
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even though the issuing magistrate has already resolved that issue.22
If the suppression judge agrees with the defendant, he is saying that
the magistrate erred as a matter of law in issuing the warrant-that
is, that he stupidly or unreasonably issued it. Can it be more unseemly
if the suppression judge holds that the magistrate was deceived by a
facially sufficient, but untrue, affidavit?
The fifth argument is that permitting a sub-facial attack at a
suppression hearing would confuse the ultimate issue of the defen-
dant's guilt with the preliminary issue of whether someone misrepre-
sented information in an affidavit.23 This argument is nonsensical.
If the suppression hearing takes place before trial,24 there is no possi-
bility of confusion; if it occurs during a jury trial, the jury should be
sent out of the courtroom; and if it takes place during a bench trial,
the judge surely ought to know that the issues of guilt and probable
cause are separate. Any confusion, therefore, can only be attributable
either to procedural irregularity or to gross ignorance, over neither
of which has the defendant any control and for neither of which
should he be penalized.
The sixth argument rests on a notion of mutuality. The argument
is that, because the government is not permitted to give extra-facial
support to a facially insufficient affidavit, the defendant should be
precluded from attacking a facially sufficient affidavit. 2 This argu-
ment, too, is fundamentally unsound. Occasionally, an affiant, pos-
sessing information sufficient to establish probable cause, will im-
providently fail to put enough of it into the affidavit to make the
affidavit facially sufficient. If the case is one in which a warrant is
not constitutionally required, the government will be permitted, at a
suppression hearing, to abandon the warrant and its defective affida-
vit and to rely, instead, upon all of the affiant's information to estab-
lish probable cause for the arrest or search.26 However, if the case is
one in which a warrant is constitutionally required, then only the
information given to the issuing magistrate can be considered in de-
termining whether there was probable cause. In some instances, the
information will comprise sworn, oral evidence in addition to the
contents of a facially deficient affidavit. In that event, all of the
2 See cases cited note 2 supra.
2 Note, supra note 1, at 1530.
24 Modern procedural systems require a pretrial motion and contemplate pretrial resolu-
tion. See FED. R. CRI, . P. 12(b)(3), 12(e).
People v. Bak, 45 Il1. 2d 140, 145, 258 N.E.2d 341, 344, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882
(1970).
26 Bell v. United States, 371 F.2d 35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1040 (1967).
21 See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.l (1964).
36 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 721 (1975)
information may be considered, not only by the issuing magistrate
but also by the judge who conducts the suppression hearing., But if
an affidavit is the sole source of information received by the magis-
trate, then only the affidavit may be considered in determining
whether there was probable cause. Other information, possessed by
the affiant but not transmitted to the magistrate, must be ignored.29
In this case, and in this case only, is the government prohibited from
giving extra-facial support to a facially insufficient affidavit.
If the mutuality argument were really based on mutuality, it
would treat defendant and government alike, giving each the same
benefit and disadvantage. But it does not. Rather, it bars the defen-
dant in all instances from making a sub-facial attack even though the
government is prohibited in but one instance from offering extra-
facial support. It is, therefore, far too one-sided to be based on any
rational notion of mutuality."
The seventh argument is that permitting sub-facial attacks at a
suppression hearing would make it necessary for the government to
disclose the identity of confidential informants and thereby jeopard-
ize their safety or usefulness."1 In McCray v. Illinois,2 the United
States Supreme Court held that a defendant has no constitutional
right to compel disclosure of an informant's identity at a suppression
hearing even though an arrest or search was based on the informant's
information. In jurisdictions that follow McCray,33 this holding
makes it impossible for a defendant to sustain a sub-facial attack by
examining a confidential informant. Logically, however, it should not
bar a sub-facial attack as long as the defendant is willing to confine
23 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
2 See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1 (1964).
30 In any event, the mutuality argument proceeds from an erroneous premise. As indi-
cated above, the government is prohibited from offering extra-facial support to a deficient
affidavit only when two conditions are met: (I) a warrant is constitutionally required, and (2)
the extra-facial support comprises information not transmitted to the issuing magistrate. To
permit the government to supplement a facially deficient affidavit with information not trans-
mitted to the magistrate would be to ignore the constitutionally required role of the magistrate.
Prohibiting such extra-facial support is simply an implementation of the magistrate's role. It
is not a justification for ignoring the role played by others in determining whether probable
cause exists. The unarticulated premise underlying the mutuality argument is that, in a case
involving a warrant, the only relevant question is whether the magistrate properly performed
his role. The incorrectness of the premise is developed infra, text at nn. 85-90.
" See People v. Bak, 45 I11. 2d 140, 145-46, 258 N.E.2d 341, 344, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
882 (1970).
32 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
McCray does not prohibit disclosure. Hence legislatures and courts are free to develop
criteria under which disclosure is permitted. For an example, see People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.
2d 163, 313 N.E.2d 41, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1974).
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his examination to the affiant, whose identity is always disclosed in
the affidavit, to an informant whose identity may be known, 34 or to
any other witness of known identity. Yet, courts that rely on the
McCray rule prohibit all sub-facial attacks, even those that do not
impinge upon informer secrecy." To that extent they abuse McCray
in the same way they abuse the principle of mutuality, and the argu-
ment of informer secrecy cannot be taken seriously.
None of the commonly advanced arguments adequately supports
the refusal of many courts to permit sub-facial attacks at a suppres-
sion hearing. Underlying some of the arguments, however, are two
themes, one directly relating to the substance of the fourth amend-
ment, the other dealing with its implementation. The substantive
theme is that fourth amendment standards are met as long as an
affidavit is facially sufficient to establish probable cause, that an
affidavit's untruth is irrelevant to the concerns of the fourth amend-
ment, and that sub-facial attacks are therefore unnecessary.36 The
implementational theme, baldly stated, is that sub-facial attacks im-
plicate the exclusionary rule, that the costs of exclusion far outweigh
the benefits, and that, to avoid the costs, it is necessary to tamper
with the substance of the fourth amendment.37 I shall explore the
substantive theme after discussing the arguments commonly ad-
vanced in favor of sub-facial attacks. The implementational theme is
but a specific illustration of the cosmic debate surrounding the exclu-
sionary rule,3" and is beyond the scope of this article.
III. COMMONLY ADVANCED ARGUMENTS FOR PERMITTING SUB-
FACIAL ATTACKS AT A SUPPRESSION HEARING
The question is not whether every sub-facial attack should be
permitted without condition or restriction. Rather, the question is
whether there are persuasive fourth amendment arguments for per-
mitting at least some of them. If there are, it will then become appro-
priate to consider whether all such attacks should be allowed, or
" E.g., United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 984 n.1 (7th Cir. 1973): United States
v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1972).
See People v. Bak, 45 I11. 2d 140, 258 N.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970).
State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 177, 293 A.2d 649, 655 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945
(1973). In Petillo, the court relied on Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925). The
inapplicability of Dumbra is discussed infra at note 90.
" See State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 178, 293 A.2d 649, 655 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
945 (1973). Cf. United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
1 For a comprehensive collection of materials, see Schrock and Welsh, Up from Calan-
dra: The Exclusionary Rule as A Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974).
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whether there are countervailing arguments of equal or greater
weight for imposing limitations.
On the whole, cases that permit a sub-facial attack are about as
poorly reasoned as cases prohibiting it. Some courts permit the at-
tack without explanation. 9 Others rely solely on a rebuttal of rea-
sons for prohibiting the attack4°-a common, but insufficient, method
of analysis. A few courts invoke the doctrine of "supervisory pow-
ers." 4' That doctrine, however, disclaims reliance on fourth amend-
ment considerations, and is therefore beyond the concerns of this
article.
Even courts that attempt to construct a fourth amendment ra-
tionale fail. Some characterize the evidence as "tainted"-i.e. as
derivative of the misrepresentative affidavit-without clearly
articulating why the affidavit violates the fourth amendment.42 In
effect, they rely on the exclusionary rule's policy of suppressing the
fruit of the poisoned tree without establishing that the tree was really
poisoned.43 A few courts perceive a relationship between misrepre-
sentative affidavits and probable cause, but they fail to develop it.44
The best of a bad lot of legal analysis is the following statement from
United States v. Halsey: "when the Fourth Amendment demands a
factual showing sufficient to comprise 'probable cause,' the obvious
assumption is that there will be a truthful showing. 45
The commentators have been almost as remiss as the courts. A
publication of the American Law Institute argues for sub-facial at-
tacks on the ground that the warrant-issuing procedure is ex parte."1
The argument is true as far as it goes, but it does not go very far. It
misses the question whether fourth amendment values are subverted
by a facially sufficient, but misrepresentative, affidavit. In three
widely cited articles-one of which has influenced several courts-the
31 E.g., United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1960): "That such a hearing
was proper is hardly open to question." See United States v. Marihart, 492 F.2d 897 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827 (1974).
o E.g., United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50, 54 (9th Cir. 1974).
' United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 988 n.13 (7th Cir. 1973). See generally Hill,
The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181,(1969); Note, The
Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963).
42 United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218, 1222 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
934 (1972). See United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 1974).
13 See Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 369.
" E.g., United States v. Luna, 525 F. 2d 4, 8 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Morris,
477 F.2d 657, 663 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 852 (1973).
257 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (emphasis in original).
" MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 570 (Prop. Off. Draft, April 15,
1975) (Commentary).
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argument for sub-facial attacks is made to rest on the need for achiev-
ing the objectives of the exclusionary rule by deterring misrepresen-
tative affidavits or preserving the integrity of the judicial process. 47
As noted above, however, the exclusionary rule does not come into
play until a fourth amendment violation has been established, and
characterizing a police practice as unsavory or dishonest does not
automatically make it unconstitutional.
More commentators than judges assert that there is a relation-
ship between misrepresentative affidavits and the fourth amend-
ment's requirement of probable cause. Relatively few attempt to ex-
plicate it. Thus, it has been argued that there is no difference between
an affidavit that is facially defective and one that is facially sufficient
but misrepresentative;" and that it would make little sense to hold
that probable cause cannot be established by a facially defective affi-
davit, but that the same affidavit, supplemented by false allegations,
is sufficient. 9
The most thoughtful effort to develop a fourth amendment
theory in support of sub-facial attacks stresses the role or function
of the issuing magistrate in protecting the right to privacy. 0 The
magistrate is expected to be both neutral and detached, as opposed
to being a rubber stamp for the affiant. This function is frustrated
by baldly conclusory affidavits. Hence, an affidavit must contain
enough factual information to enable the magistrate to make his own
assessment of whether probable cause exists. Implicit in this require-
ment is a "concern for truth."'" If the magistrate's function is frus-
trated by conclusions, it is equally frustrated by false information.
Although it is hard to disagree with these arguments, it must be
recognized that, in a hierarchy of fourth amendment values, the role
of the magistrate is derivative rather than primary. How we expect
the magistrate to function and the extent to which we want to super-
vise his functioning depend ultimately on our perception of other
fourth amendment values." If searches or seizures could be made on
hunch alone, magistrates would be luxuries, not necessities. But a
"1 Kipperman, supra note 7, at 826, 830-31; Mascolo, supra note 9, at 17; Note, supra note
I, at 1530-3 1. The influential article is Kipperman's. See United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d
58, 61 nn. 3, 4 (Ist Cir. 1974); United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1973).
, 51 CORN. L. Q. 822, 825 (1966).
" Id. See 15 BUFF. L. REV. 712, 717 (1966); 34 FORD. L. REV. 740, 744-45 (1966).
Comment, supra note 1, at 107-8.
I' d. at 108.
Cf Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13-14 (1948).
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hunch is not constitutionally sufficient. Probable cause is required,5 3
and the warrant-issuing process is a device for giving it meaning.54
Similarly, if exploratory searches or dragnet arrests were permissible,
a formal, warrant-issuing process would be trivial. But such police
practices are not constitutional.55 Particularity is the fourth amend-
ment's requirement, 6 and it, too, is served by the magistrate. A sound
fourth amendment argument for permitting sub-facial attacks must,
therefore, begin with a consideration of the function and importance
of probable cause and particularity.
IV. THE FUNCTION, IMPORTANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
PROBABLE CAUSE AND PARTICULARITY-A FOURTH AMENDMENT
RATIONALE FOR PERMITTING SUB-FACIAL ATTACKS
A. Introduction
The function of the bill of rights in general and of the fourth
amendment in particular is to chart a course between a free society
and a safe one.57 If the members of a society never inflicted injury,
the libertarian ideal would flatly prohibit all searches and seizures as
pointless incursions into personal liberty. But that is not, and never
has been, our society. Some searches and seizures must therefore be
tolerated. It is not that they are good; it is that they are justifiable
evils. As such, they are exceptions to the libertarian ideal " and must
be kept within narrow bounds. The fourth amendment and its judicial
gloss delineate the boundaries.
B. Probable Cause and Particularity: The Prohibition of "General"
or "Exploratory" Intrusions and the Value of Innocent Privacy
The first requirement is probable cause. Within the meaning of
this requirement it is imperative that the government have a reasona-
ble basis in fact for believing that a crime has been committed. 59
" U.S. CONST, amend. IV. It is irrelevant to the concerns of this article that certain
intrusions may constitutionally be authorized without probable cause. See Camara v. Munici-
pal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1975); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 13-14 (1948).
11 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5' Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1975); Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 353-54.
See Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 47, 50-51
(1974).
" Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth
Amendment, 28 U. CHi. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961).
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Absent such basis there can be no justification in the ordinary case
for any search or for the seizure of any person or thing."0
The second requirement is particularity. The essence of this re-
quirement is "focus." If the government proposes to take custody of
a human being, it must focus on a specific person; if it proposes to
take custody of a thing, it must focus on a specific thing and a specific
place. It is not enough, for example, that the government has a rea-
sonable basis in fact for believing that a murder has been committed.
If the government wants to search for evidence of that crime, it must
also have in mind specific evidence that is located at a specific place.
Even the certainty that a crime has been committed will not justify a
search for undifferentiated or unlocalized evidence."
The third requirement is a mixture of probable cause and partic-
ularity. If the government proposes to seize a specific person, it must
ordinarily have a reasonable basis in fact for believing that that per-
son committed the crime in question; if it proposes to search for and
seize a specific thing, it must have a reasonable basis in fact for
believing that the object is crime-related and that it is located at the
place to be searched.62
If the government's case fails in any of the above respects, the
intrusion is said to be unconstitutionally "general" or "explora-
tory." 3 Although these words do not appear in the fourth amend-
ment, the cases make it clear that they describe the very intrusion that
the constitution-makers sought to prohibit." Unfortunately, however,
the words do not reveal why the constitution-makers regarded such
an intrusion as intolerable. To answer that obviously crucial question,
consider what life would be like if intrusions were permitted without
probable cause and particularity. Undoubtedly, the police would con-
tinue to arrest criminals and to search for and seize crime-related
objects. At the same time, they would arrest more innocent persons,
enter more innocent premises, view more innocent activities, and
seize more innocent objects than they now do. 6 But innocent privacy
E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 411.
12 Comment, supra note 59, at 687-88.
" Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931).
91 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-27 (1886); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 19-48 (1966); Weinreb, supra note 58, at 50.
" Indeed, one of the most persuasive arguments against permitting "stops" and "frisks"
on less than probable cause was that the practice would increase police confrontations with
innocent persons. See, for example, Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial
Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 433, 445-53 (1967); Souris, Stop and Frisk
or Arrest and Search-The Use and Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 251,
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should not be associated solely with innocent persons, for even the
guilty live lives that are for the most part innocent. If the police have
probable cause to believe that D has stolen a suit, they may arrest
him, but they may not indiscriminately seize every suit in his closet.66
If the police have probable cause to believe that D has stolen a
particular suit, they may arrest him and look in his closet, but they
may not look in apparently innocent areas such as his medicine cabi-
net, or jewelry box, or diary."
In a free society, innocent and guilty alike have a right to expect
that official intrusions into any aspect of their innocent or apparently
innocent lives will be kept to the barest minimum compatible with
public safety. Intrusions without probable cause and particularity
would defeat that expectation. Thus, the primary objective of the
requirements of probable cause and particularity must be to bring
that expectation close to reality by directing intrusive activity toward
apparent guilt and away from apparently innocent privacy."
C. The Probable-Cause Process
1. Introduction
At this point, it will simplify matters considerably if we omit
further reference to particularity, and concentrate solely on the re-
quirement of probable cause. Probable cause is a label that describes
the results of a process. The process has three basic aspects: (1)
acquiring information, (2) transmitting it, and (3) drawing inferences
from it. The question that now arises is whether, given the importance
of probable cause in the fourth amendment's scheme, a concern for
accuracy either is or ought to be a part of the process.
As a predicate for answering the question, it is essential to note
that the probable-cause process is divided into two sub-processes.
One is the warrant-issuing process; the other, the process of warrant-
less action. The fourth amendment has not been interpreted to pre-
252-53 (1966). The evidence contributed by Professor Reich, based on personal experience, is
impressive. Reich, Police Questioning of Law-A biding Citizens, 75 YALE L. J. 1161 (1966).
The factual content of the argument was not rejected by the Court when it decided Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). Rather, the Court was willing to tolerate the increased risk of
innocent, but not too intrusive, confrontations in order to achieve the objectives of crime
prevention and protection. Id. at 22-27.
1 See Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
67 Cf Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1967).
,' See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176-77 (1949). Cf United States v. Lef-
kowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,
358 (1931); Weinreb, supra note 58, at 50-54; Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 403, 432-33.
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elude warrantless action. Although such action has been said to be
* . per se [unconstitutional] under the Fourth Amendment-
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions,"69 the exceptions, taken as a whole, are broad, and
warrantless action is common.70 Whether an intrusion is made with
or without a warrant, however, probable cause is essential; and,
even though this article focuses narrowly on intrusions with a war-
rant, it will be helpful to begin analysis by considering situations that
do not involve a warrant.
2. Intrusion Without a Warrant
The question posed above may now be restated: whether, given
the importance of probable cause in the fourth amendment's scheme,
a concern for accuracy either is or ought to be a part of the probable-
cause process in a case involving warrantless intrusion. If, for exam-
ple, a police officer makes a warrantless arrest, may probable cause
ever be said to exist if the crime for which the arrest was made had,
as a matter of fact, been committed by no one? Suppose that a plain-
clothes police officer is on duty at a department store that has re-
cently sustained severe shop-lifting losses. The officer observes D
standing next to a counter display of wallets. The officer knows that
D has previously been convicted of shop-lifting. The officer observes
D glancing around, taking a wallet and putting it in his coat pocket.
From his observations, the officer infers that D has committed a
theft. As a result of the inference, he arrests D and searches him. The
search discloses that the only wallet in D's possession is his own, and
that D is carrying a concealed weapon. Subsequent inquiry discloses
that D had placed his own wallet on the counter and was putting it
back in his pocket when he was observed by the officer. Did the
officer have probable cause to arrest D? As a matter of objective fact,
the officer was wrong. He began his observation after D had placed
his own wallet on the counter. As a result, he drew an erroneous
inference. The crime for which the arrest was made had been commit-
ted by no one. At the same time, it may be argued that the officer
acted carefully in acquiring the information and evaluating it. He
could not reasonably be expected to keep all customers under simul-
taneous and constant surveillance. Given his knowledge of D's record
and his observation of conduct strongly suggestive of shop-lifting, his
61 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
70 L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 105-6 (1967).
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inference, although wrong, was reasonable. If the fourth amendment
is itself a compromise between a free society and a safe one, law
enforcement officers must, to some extent, be permitted to rely on
reasonable appearances. Even though arrests are an exception to the
libertarian ideal, and even though exceptions ought to be narrowly
confined, a standard of absolute accuracy would result in paralysis.
Hence, balancing the interests at stake and keeping in mind that
reasonable errors are inevitable, we would be justified in saying that
the officer did have probable cause to arrest D for shop-lifting. That,
of course, is what the cases have said for years. Even though probable
cause is central to the operation of the fourth amendment, it is not
synonymous with being right."
To the extent indicated above, a concern for accuracy is not a
part of the probable cause process in a case involving warrantless
intrusion. That does not mean, however, that we ought to be uncon-
cerned to any greater extent. Suppose that an officer arrests D with-
out a warrant, searches him, finds a concealed weapon, and charges
that offense. Prior to trial, D's lawyer files a motion to suppress the
weapon. At the suppression hearing, the officer is the government's
sole witness. He testifies, precisely in accordance with the situation
above, that he arrested D, a known shop-lifter, only after observing
D take a wallet from a counter display. The officer's testimony is, in
effect, a claim that his action was based on facts establishing probable
cause. Is that claim legally subject to attack through cross-
examination or independent evidence, or are we so unconcerned with
accuracy that we will uncritically accept a facially sufficient claim?
To heighten the drama, assume that A, B and C are prepared to
testify that they had dined with D in the store's cafeteria; that, as all
four were leaving the store, the officer suddenly stopped, arrested and
searched D; and that D at no time took anything from any counter
display. Should their testimony be legally admissible?
If believed, the testimony of A, B, and C will refute the govern-
ment's claim that it had acquired the information upon which a deter-
mination of probable cause must rest. If the officer is telling the truth,
he did acquire the information; if the witnesses are telling the truth,
he did not. Given the fourth amendment primacy of probable cause,
the testimony of the witnesses should be admissible. Any other rule
would make it unnecessary for the government to have knowledge as
justification for intrusive action; the mere claim of such knowledge
1, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
167 (1949).
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would suffice. Pretense would be substituted for actuality, and the
risk of invading innocent privacy would increase, contrary to the very
function of the probable-cause requirement. No legitimate interest of
government demands such a result; the fourth amendment, itself a
compromise, prohibits it.
The jump from policy to precedent is apparently as short here
as it was in the situation involving the erroneous, but reasonable,
inference. I say "apparently" because I have found no case other than
McCray v. Illinois72 that even partially immunizes the testimony of
the warrantless intruder from cross-examination or refutation. In-
deed, even if one is disposed to read between the lines as much as
possible in the government's favor, the position of all the authorities
is that the officer's testimony is open to attack at the suppression
hearing.73
The two situations discussed above are polar contexts for an-
swering the question whether, in a case of warrantless intrusion, we
ought to be concerned with the accuracy of the information and
inferences that necessarily underlie probable cause. On the one hand,
we permit reasonable reliance on appearances; on the other, we probe
beneath the surface of the claim that the appearances existed. It is
now appropriate to apply these approaches to a case that falls be-
tween the extremes.
Officer X receives a telephone call from Officer Y. "I'm on
shop-lift duty at The Big Store," says Y. "I just saw D take a wallet
from a counter display. He didn't pay for it. He got out of the store
before I could arrest him. He often hangs out at Sam's Billiard
Emporium. Go there and make the arrest." Relying on the informa-
tion he has received from Y, X arrests D, searches him, and finds,
not a stolen wallet, but a concealed weapon. After D is charged, he
files a motion to suppress. At the suppression hearing, Officer X is
the government's sole witness. He testifies that he arrested D after
receiving the call from Y, and he relates the contents of the call. D
is perfectly willing to concede that Officer X has testified truthfully.
He proposes, however, to offer the testimony of A, B and C in an
effort to establish that Officer Y did not observe the incident he
recounted to X. Should the testimony be admissible?
- 386 U.S. 300 (1967). In McCray, the warrantless intruder was a police officer who
claimed to have acted on the basis of information from an informant. The officer's testimony
was subjected to cross-examination. Full cross-examination was blocked, however, by the
Court's holding that due process did not require disclosure of the informant's identity.
" E.g., A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL, M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CASES § 241 (3rd ed. 1974); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 229 (4th ed. 1974). Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 314 (1967).
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Note that Officer X is much like the officer in our first case.74
He acquired information and drew two inferences from it. The first
inference was that Officer Y was telling the truth; the second, that D
had committed theft. In all respects, X acted reasonably. He cor-
rectly heard Y's statements, and he drew reasonable inferences.
Surely it is reasonable for one officer to assume the veracity of an-
other.7 5 Officer Y, by contrast, is much like the officer in our second
case.7" His credibility is doubtful. If he observed the incident as he
claimed to X, there was a factual basis for the arrest. If we believe
A, B and C, however, that basis did not exist.
Given the policies underlying the fourth amendment and the
function and importance of probable cause, there is no fourth amend-
ment reason for excluding the testimony of A, B and C. To immunize
the conduct of Officer Y from judicial scrutiny would, as in the
second case, substitute pretease for actuality. Moreover, it would
permit government employees-the official functionaries of the
probable-cause process-to subvert that process by increasing the
risk of invading innocent privacy. The fourth amendment speaks to
officialdom. To Officers X and Y and all their law-enforcement col-
leagues we entrust the value of privacy and the delicate compromise
that justifies intrusion. When, as in the present case, more than one
official custodian of fourth amendment values participates in an im-
pingement upon privacy, the knowledge and conduct of each should
be relevant and subject to scrutiny. No legitimate interest of govern-
ment requires that we drop an iron curtain between the activities of
X and Y, thereby excluding Y's role, when the actions of both are
the actions of government, and when the intrusion into D's privacy
would not have taken place but for Y's unjustified instigation. The
concern for accuracy in this case should be as great as it was in the
second case.
Again, the leap from policy to precedent is short, although a bit
longer than in the first and second cases. The only relevant Supreme
Court decision is Whiteley v. Warden.77 In that case, a magistrate
erroneously issued a warrant on the strength of a facially insufficient
affidavit. The sheriff to whom the warrant was issued then put out a
radio bulletin ordering the arrest of the defendant and stating that a
warrant had been issued. Relying on the bulletin, an officer arrested
7' P. 733 supra.
11 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965). See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S.
560, 568 (1971).
P. 734 supra.
401 U.S. 560 (1971).
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the defendant, searched him and found incriminating items. In the
Supreme Court, one of the state's arguments was that, even though
the warrant was defective, the arresting officer acted reasonably and,
therefore, constitutionally in relying on the radio bulletin. The
Court's response is instructive:
Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers in execut-
ing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers request-
ing aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support
an independent judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, how-
ever, the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal arrest
cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating
officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.71
Whiteley is, of course, not an exact match for our third case.
Whiteley involved an underlying warrant based on a facially insuffi-
cient affidavit, while our third case deals with wholly warrantless
action. The difference, however, is insignificant. The quotation from
Whiteley makes eminently good sense if paraphrased to read on the
facts of the third case:
Certainly police officers called upon to make warrantless arrests on
the basis of information that other officers claim to possess are
entitled to assume that the other officers are telling the truth.
Where, however, the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise
illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of
the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.
It is, therefore, not surprising that lower federal courts have consis-
tently read Whiteley as applying to wholly warrantless intrusions.79
The three cases considered above deal with warrantless action.
They demonstrate that a concern for accuracy is, and ought to be, a
part of the probable-cause process. If a single government function-
ary is involved, it is essential that, as a matter of fact, he acquire
information supporting the reasonable belief that a prospective arres-
tee has committed a crime or that specific evidence of crime is located
at a specific place. If several governmental functionaries are sequen-
tially involved, as in the third case, the knowledge and conduct of
7' Id. at 568.
" Weeks v. Estelle, 509 F.2d 760, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Murray, 492
F.2d 178, 188 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Roberts v. United States, 419 U.S. 854
(1974) (dictum); United States v. Averitt, 477 F.2d 1009, 1010 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
851 (1973). Some state courts, however, have overlooked Whiteley. See State v. King, 324
N.E.2d 292 (Ohio App. 1975). So has the American Law Institute. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.3(2) (Prop. Off. Draft, April 15, 1975).
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each are subject to inquiry. That a functionary drew an erroneous
inference from information is not important, unless the inference was
unreasonable or the information was acquired in a careless way. That
a functionary did not possess the information he claimed to possess,
however, is crucial. The question that now arises is whether different
rules should apply when one of the sequential functionaries is a mag-
istrate-that is, when we shift from warrantless action to the warrant
process.
3. Intrusion with a Warrant
A "warrant version" of our third case will illustrate the problem.
Officer Y files with Magistrate X an affidavit for an arrest warrant.
He asserts that, while on shop-lift duty at a department store, he
observed D take a wallet without paying for it. Relying on Y's fa-
cially sufficient affidavit, X issues a warrant. D is arrested and
searched, and a concealed weapon is found. After D is charged with
unlawful possession of the weapon, he files a motion to suppress. At
the suppression hearing, the government's sole evidence is the war-
rant with affidavit. D concedes that the affidavit is facially sufficient.
He proposes, however, to offer the testimony of A, B and C (or to
cross-examine Officer Y) to establish that the incident allegedly ob-
served by Y did not take place. Should the testimony be admissible?
Note that Magistrate X is much like the innocent officer in our
first" and third"1 cases. He acquired information and drew two infer-
ences from it. The first inference was that Officer Y had filed a
truthful affidavit; the second, that D had committed theft. In all
respects, Magistrate X acted reasonably. He correctly read Y's affi-
davit and he drew reasonable inferences. Officer Y, however, is a
counterpart to the officer of doubtful credibility in our second8" and
third cases. If he observed the incident as he claimed in the affidavit,
there was a factual basis for the arrest. If we believe D's witnesses,
however, that basis did not exist.
The fourth amendment policies underlying our resolution of the
third case83 need not be restated. Suffice it to say that they are fully
applicable here. Given those policies, it is hard to understand how any
court, especially after Whiteley, 4 could prohibit sub-facial attacks.
8 P. 733 supra.
1, P. 735 supra.
82 P. 734 supra.
83 P. 736 supra.
" 401 U.S. 560 (1971), discussed supra in text at note 77 et seq.
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That courts have done so bespeaks either ignorance or gross misper-
ception of the probable-cause process.
In the second section of this article, I indicated that a substantive
theme underlies some of the arguments against sub-facial attacks. 5
It is that fourth amendment values are served as long as an affidavit
is facially sufficient, and that an affidavit's untruth is therefore irrele-
vant. Implicit in that theme is the premise that, in a case involving a
warrant, the critical question is whether the magistrate properly per-
formed his role. The premise is far too narrow. The critical question
in all cases is whether the fourth amendment's goal of protecting
innocent privacy was subverted by the actions of any of the function-
aries of government who participated in the process that led to the
intrusion. To answer that question, the knowledge and conduct of
each of the functionaries must be considered. After all, it is the very
essence of Whiteley that nothing in the fourth amendment is limited
to a single functionary.8
It is true that, of the various functionaries who participate in the
probable-cause and warrant-issuing processes, the magistrate is sup-
posed to play a unique role. The assumption underlying the warrant
clause of the fourth amendment is that innocent privacy will be jeop-
ardized if the probable-cause process (the very core of the fourth
amendment) is entrusted solely to law enforcement officers who,
"..*. in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,""
are likely to draw every inference and resolve every doubt in favor
of taking intrusive action. To safeguard innocent privacy, we there-
fore insist that a "neutral and detached" 8 magistrate draw the
inferences and resolve the doubts. But the importance of this function
should not blind us to the fact that it is only a part of the probable-
cause process, and the final part, at that. The antecedent parts are
the acquisition and transmission of the very information that the
magistrate must evaluate. These parts cannot feasibly be adminis-
tered by the magistrate and must therefore be entrusted to law en-
forcement officers. That we assign different parts of the probable-
cause process to different functionaries is hardly reason for viewing
either the parts or the functionaries in isolation. It does not trivialize
the magistrate's inference-drawing task to say that it is no more
important than the officer's task of acquiring information and
" See text supra at note 36.
" The statements made above explain why, in note 30 supra, I characterized the mutuality
argument as resting on an erroneous premise.
" Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
FId.
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transmitting it to the magistrate. Indeed, it makes utterly no sense
to ask only whether the magistrate drew a reasonable inference with-
out asking whether the information from which he drew the inference
was acquired carelessly or transmitted inaccurately.89 Probable cause
and its process are a whole. If any part is defective, if any functionary
performs improperly, the whole fails, thereby increasing the risk of
invading innocent privacy and subverting the fourth amendment's
primary value.
When a court is concerned only with whether the magistrate had
probable cause (that is, whether the magistrate properly performed
his role), it indicates either that it does not understand the multifa-
ceted nature of probable cause and its process or that it does not
understand that each part is as important as any other. Sub-facial
attacks are intended to expose the malfunctioning of the law-
enforcement part, but no less to assert the total failure of probable
cause and the consequent risk to innocent privacy. When a court
prohibits sub-facial attacks by dropping an iron curtain between mag-
istrate and affiant, it fragments the process to such an extent that the
sum of the parts no longer equals the whole. To the same extent it
diminishes the protection that innocent privacy is constitutionally
entitled to receive.
To answer the question posed early in this section, a concern for
accuracy must be a part of the probable-cause process (and of each
of its components) whether an intrusion is made with a warrant or
without one. In the warrant context, fidelity to fourth amendment
principle requires that sub-facial attacks be permitted. Any other rule
is manifestly and unarguably wrong."
" Perhaps the admonition of Professor Thomas Reed Powell to his law students
is apt; "if you can think of something which is inextricably related to some other
thing and not think of the other thing, you have a legal mind."
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1974), affd, 511 F.2d
199 (3rd Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1989 (1975).
0 I have omitted from discussion in the text a Supreme Court decision the result of which
supports the arguments made above, but the opinion in which is too laconic to be helpful. The
case is Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), and its relevancy
appears to have been overlooked by both courts and commentators. In Silverthorne, federal
agents made a warrantless, general search of defendants' office and seized documents that
contained evidence of a federal offense. After the documents were returned to the defendants
by court order, the government sought their production by subpoena. The defendants refused
to comply and were held in contempt. On writ of error, the Supreme Court reversed the
contempt conviction. Although the subpoena was facially sufficient, it could not be insulated
from the antecedent unconstitutionality. To do so, in the Court's view, would have reduced the
fourth amendment "to a form of words." Id. at 392.
Silverthorne may be viewed merely as an application of the exclusionary rule's derivative
evidence aspect, in which case it is hardly relevant to the problem under discussion. On the
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V. THE SCOPE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A RULE PERMITTING SUB-
FACIAL ATTACKS
A. Introduction
The argument made in Section IV of this article was intended
to answer the narrow question raised at the outset of Section III:
whether there is a persuasive fourth amendment rationale for permit-
ting at least some sub-facial attacks. Given the narrowness of the
question, I felt justified in using an easy hypothetical case for pur-
poses of illustration. The case was easy because it implied that the
affiant, who was a police officer, had knowingly lied about matters
that went to the very heart of the magistrate's probable cause deter-
mination." If a sub-facial attack were not permitted in the hypotheti-
cal case, it would not be permitted in any case.
other hand, the initial intrusion flagrantly violated standards for the protection of innocent
privacy, and the Court's refusal to insulate the subpoena from antecedent unconstitutionality
is much like permitting a sub-facial attack on the subpoena.
Although the subpoena-issuer in Silverthorne probably had knowledge of the antecedent
unconstitutionality, id. at 391, it is hard to believe that good faith issuance would have led to a
different result. Indeed, some courts have suppressed evidence obtained by search warrant
where the warrant, although issued in good faith, was based on unconstitutionally obtained
information. E.g., White v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 535, 299 S.W. 168 (1927); Everhart v.
State, abstracted in 17 Crim. L. Reptr. 2107 (Md. 1975). Ironically, in both White and
Everhart, the court prohibited sub-facial attacks that were intended to expose untruths in the
affidavit, apparently not recognizing that there is also an untruth in an affidavit that fails to
disclose the manner in which the information was obtained, thereby leading the magistrate to
assume that the information had been obtained constitutionally.
I have also omitted from the text a discussion of Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435
(1925), which some courts have relied on as authority for prohibiting sub-facial attacks. See
note 36, supra. Commenting on the sufficiency of an affidavit that was based on the personal
knowledge of the affiant, the Court said:
In determing what is probable cause, we are not called upon to determine
whether the offense charged has in fact been committed. We are concerned only with
the question whether the affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit
and the issuance of the warrant for the belief that the law was being violated on the
premises to be searched; and if the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such
that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that there was a
commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause justifying the issuance of
a warrant.
Id. at 441 (emphasis added). Taken out of context, the latter part of the Court's statement
would appear to support the no-sub-facial-attack position. In context, however, it is clear that
the Court did not drop an iron curtain between affiant and magistrate. To the contrary, it was
concerned with whether the affiant had reasonable grounds for the very belief that led him to
file the affidavit with the magistrate. Given the fact that the truth of the allegations was not
questioned by the defendant, Dumbra is hardly strong support for permitting sub-facial attacks.
But it is no support at all for prohibiting them. See Kipperman, supra note 7, at 827-28; 34
FORD. L. REv. 740, 744 (1966).
'1 P. 738 supra.
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Real life, however, involves hard cases as well as easy ones.
Consider the following variations of the hypothetical case.
(1) In his affidavit, the affiant truthfully recounts information
supplied by Z. Z, however, knowingly lied to the affiant about a
material matter, and the affiant innocently transmitted the lie to the
magistrate. Has the fourth amendment been violated if Z is (a) an-
other police officer, (b) an informant who has a working relationship
with the police, or (c) a private citizen who has never given informa-
tion to the police and who volunteered the information on the present
occasion?
(2) The source of a material misrepresentation is a person
whose knowledge or conduct may be drawn into question by a sub-
facial attack. Has the fourth amendment been violated if the misre-
presentation was (a) reckless rather than purposeful or knowing, (b)
negligent rather than reckless, or (c) innocent rather than negligent?
(3) The source of a misrepresentation is a person whose knowl-
edge or conduct may be questioned sub-facially. The person's culpa-
bility satisfies the answer to question (2). Has the fourth amendment
been violated if the affidavit, purged of the misrepresentation, still
establishes probable cause?
The three sets of questions posed above have vexed both judges
and commentators-even those who do not oppose all sub-facial at-
tacks.2 This is far from surprising, however. As indicated in Section
III, both case law and commentary have failed to develop a cohesive
fourth amendment rationale in support of sub-facial attacks.93 Al-
though the absence of such a rationale does not necessarily impede
the resolution of easy cases, it inevitably complicates the task of
dealing with hard ones. Part of the utility of the rationale advanced
in Section IV is that it should facilitate answering at least some of
the questions posed above.
B. Misconduct by an Informant
The first set of questions deals with the persons, other than the
affiant, whose knowledge or conduct may be questioned sub-facially.
The issue has arisen infrequently, undoubtedly as a result of the
constraints imposed by McCray v. Illinois.94 When those constraints
have been absent, however (as in a case in which the informant's
I E.g., United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carmi-
chael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973); Kipperman, supra note 7; Comment, supra note I.
,3 See text supra 'at note 39 et seq.
" 386 U.S. 300 (1967), discussed supra in text at note 32.
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identity is known), some courts have nevertheless limited sub-facial
attacks to the affiant, thereby insulating any informant from scru-
tiny.'5 Although this position finds impressive support in the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure,"6 it
is, in my judgment, demonstrably wrong.
The easiest case to deal with initially is one in which the affiant
has transmitted to the magistrate information received from another
law enforcement officer. As indicated in Section IV, the question in
all cases is whether the fourth amendment's goal of protecting inno-
cent privacy was subverted by any of the functionaries of government
who participated in the process that led to the intrusion . 7 If the
government entrusts the probable-cause process to multiple official
functionaries, the knowledge and conduct of each should be subject
to examination. Indeed, this principle, extrapolated from Whiteley v.
Warden," underlies a sub-facial attack on the affiant's credibility."
Once it is accepted that the fourth amendment's concept of probable
cause requires scrutiny of the knowledge and conduct 6f the affiant,
it follows that examination must be made of the knowledge and
conduct of all other official functionaries who participated in the
process that led to the intrusion. Any other result would, in fourth
amendment terms, be unprincipled. 10
" E.g., United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Jutz, 389 F. Supp. 506, 508-9 (E.D. Wisc. 1975).
" Section SS290.3(1) (Prop. Off. Draft, April 15, 1975).
'7 See text supra at note 86 et seq.
" 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
" The point is discussed supra in text at note 84 et seq.
I The statements made in the text are not inconsistent with Dumbra v. United States,
268 U.S. 435 (1925), a related aspect of which was discussed in note 90 supra. Although the
Court stated that it was "concerned only with whether the afiant had reasonable grounds,"
id. at 441 (emphasis added), it had no occasion to decide the relevance of the knowledge or
conduct of other official functionaries. The affidavit was based solely on the observations of
the affiant. Hence, there was no other functionary.
The statements above are, however, inconsistent with Rugendorf v. United States, 376
U.S. 528 (1964). Speaking of information that had been received by the affiant from other
official sources, the Court said:
Since the erroneous statements that petitioner was the manager of Rugendorf Broth-
ers Meat Market and was associated with Leo in the meat business were not those
of the affiant, they fail to show that the affiant was in bad faith or that he made any
misrepresentations to the Commissioner in securing the warrant.
Id. at 533 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). It should be noted however, that Petitioner
subordinated the issue to two others: whether the affidavit was facially sufficient, and whether
Petitioner was entitled to disclosure of an informant's identity. Brief for Petitioner at i-ii.
Petitioner's offhanded treatment of the issue may have provoked the Court's thoughtless re-
sponse. In any event, the statement in Rugendorf must be regarded as effectively overruled by
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
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If an informant is a law enforcement officer, there can be no
doubt that he is an official functionary."' 1 On the other hand, the
informant may be a private person who was in no way engaged by
an official to participate in the probable-cause process. To take a
variation of an earlier example,"' suppose that Officer X receives the
following information from Z, a first-time informant: "I am the
manager of the leather goods department at the Big Store. Five
minutes ago, I saw D take a black and gold attache case from a
counter display. He walked out of the store without paying for it."
X verifies Z's status as manager. X also learns that D has prior
convictions for shoplifting. X then drafts a facially sufficient affida-
vit, obtains an arrest warrant, and arrests D. An incidental search is
made, and a concealed weapon is found. At the suppression hearing,
the government's sole evidence is the warrant with affidavit. D con-
cedes that the affidavit is facially sufficient, that X acted reasonably,
and that he truthfully recounted to the magistrate the information he
had received from Z as well as the fruits of his own inquiry. He
proposes, however, to offer the testimony of A, B and C (or to cross-
examine Manager Z) to establish that the incident allegedly observed
by Z did not take place. Should the testimony be admissible?
If the testimony is believed, it will establish that Z, and Z alone,
acted improperly; neither Officer X nor the magistrate violated any
fourth amendment standards.0 3 Although Z was in fact a function-
ary of the probable-cause process, he was no more of an official
functionary than any other member of the public at large. He was
not in the business of law enforcement, nor were his services in any
way solicited by an official functionary. Moreover, had Z, himself,
seized the weapon from D and given it to X-that is, had Z been the
sole functionary of the process, the gun would have been admissible
as a result of the holding in Burdeau v. McDowell" 4 that the fourth
amendment is inapplicable to wholly private action. The seizure in
Burdeau was made by a private detective without governmental in-
ducement or encouragement. Private detectives are ordinarily gov-
ernment licensees and do engage in activities related to law enforce-
"'1 Cf Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S.
310, 314-16 (1927); Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 432.
112 P. 738 supra.
'0 Despite Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), it was reasonable for both the affiant
and the magistrate to rely on an informant who had not previously given reliable information.
Some of the informant's information was verified by the affiant, Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar's strict standards may be limited to professional or underworld
informers. United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1975).
104 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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ment. If their activities are regarded as wholly private for fourth
amendment purposes, the activities of Z in the case at hand must also
be ungoverned by fourth amendment standards. It would, therefore,
be fruitless to let D make the effort to impeach Z's credibility. Even
if it were clear that Z had lied to Officer X, the fourth amendment
would not have been violated.
Between a case in which the informant is clearly a law enforce-
ment officer and a case of wholly private activity, lie cases in which
the informant's status is harder to define. For giving information
about others, the informant may be promised small sums of money,
small amounts of narcotics, immunity from arrest for certain offen-
ses, or favorable treatment in a pending prosecution. On the other
hand, the informant may divulge information in the unspoken hope
of receiving some benefit. The relationship between informant and
officer may be regularized and of long duration, or it may be in-
choate. 05
To decide specific cases, it is necessary to have criteria for deter-
mining when activity that is not wholly private within Burdeau be-
comes sufficiently infused with governmental interests to justify ap-
plication of constitutional standards. The problem is far from novel.
In civil cases, courts are often called upon to decide whether ostensi-
bly private action is really "governmental" or "state" action for fifth
or fourteenth amendment purposes. 10 In criminal cases, comparable
issues arise in several contexts including search and seizure. 7 Indeed,
a recurring question is whether fourth amendment standards govern
the action of the employee of a carrier who opens a consigned pack-
age and finds contraband. 08 For present purposes, it is not important
to identify the criteria for distinguishing private from governmental
action. It is important, however, to note that in some of the situations
mentioned above, the informant clearly should be deemed a govern-
ment agent.' In terms of sub-facial attacks, this means that the
defendant is, at the very least, entitled to inquire into the relationship
between the informant and his official contact. Once he establishes
the necessary relationship, he is then entitled, subject to McCray v.
"I For a discussion of the relationship between informants and officers, see Trent v.
United States, 284 F.2d 286, 291 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 889 (1961).
101 E.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
07 Another context is entrapment. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 374-75
(1958); United States v. Waddell, 507 F.2d 1226, 1228 (5th Cir. 1975).
I" United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Krell, 388 F.
Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1975). Cf. People v. Esposito, 37 N.Y.2d 156, 332 N.E.2d 863 (1975).
IN See cases cited notes 107, 108 supra.
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Illinois,10 to try to impeach the veracity of the informant's informa-
tion. Any other rule would grant the government an immunity from
fourth amendment scrutiny whenever it turned over its undercover
investigative work to persons without official designation."',
C. Fourth Amendment Culpability
Once it has been established that the source of an alleged misre-
presentation is a person whose knowledge or conduct may be drawn
into question by a sub-facial attack, we have to cope with two other
problems: (1) the effect of determining that the misrepresentation was
purposeful, knowing, reckless, negligent, or innocent (i.e., the culpa-
bility or mens rea of the source), and (2) the effect of determining
that the misrepresentation was or was not material in establishing
probable cause. Although these problems seem analytically separate,
they have often been blended both in cases and commentary with a
resulting confusion that disserves fourth amendment values.
United States v. Carmichael'12-a leading casein-is illustra-
tive. The court stated that:
Evidence should not be suppressed unless the trial court finds that
the government agent was either recklessly or intentionally untruth-
ful. A completely innocent misrepresentation is not sufficient for
two reasons. Most importantly, the primary justification for the
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct . . . and good faith
errors cannot be deterred. Furthermore, such errors do not negate
probable cause. If an agent reasonably believes facts which on their
face indicate that a crime has probably been committed, he has
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed ....
Negligent misrepresentations are theoretically deterrable, but
11 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
M In developing the point that courts should consider the knowledge and conduct of all
official informants, I have accepted the holding in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967),
that there is no due process right to discover an informant's identity for purposes of a motion
to suppress. Although there is no tension between my views and McCray in a case in which
the informant's identity is already known, tension undeniably exists if the informant's identity
is not known. Indeed, what has been said above could easily be the basis for a fourth
amendment right to disclosure. See Comment, supra note I, at 127-33. If courts are persuaded
to permit sub-facial attacks as broadly as I have suggested, they may want to reconsider
McCray. Adherence to McCray, however, does not compel the rejection of my position. Al-
though the two cannot co-exist in perfect harmony, few fourth amendment doctrines do. "For
clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court's most
successful product." Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 349.
112 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973).
M' The influence of Carmichael may be seen, for example, in United States v. Belculfine,
508 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1974); and United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973).
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no workable test suggests itself for determining whether an officer
was negligent or completely innocent in not checking his facts fur-
ther. We therefore conclude that evidence should not be suppressed
unless the officer was at least reckless in his misrepresentation. Even
where the officer is reckless, if the misrepresentation is immaterial,
it did not affect the issuance of the warrant and there is no justifica-
tion for suppressing the evidence. Arguably, the same conclusion
could be reached as to deliberate but immaterial misrepresen-
tations. However, we conclude that if deliberate government perjury
should ever be shown, the court need not inquire as to the material-
ity of the perjury. The fullest deterrent sanctions of the exclusionary
rule should be applied to such serious and deliberate government
wrongdoing."'4
Consider this statement first from the standpoint of culpability or
mens rea. The court's position is that an innocent (i.e. not even
negligent) misrepresentation should not result in the exclusion of
evidence. The court's primary reason relates not to probable cause,
but to the deterrence objective of the exclusionary rule. Although the
court mentions probable cause, it relegates it to a secondary position,
thereby turning fourth amendment theory upside down. If an inno-
cent misrepresentation does not negate probable cause, there is no
fourth amendment violation at all, and it is pointless to consider
whether suppression would or would not advance any objective of the
exclusionary rule."' Hence, the first question in every such case has
to be whether the misrepresentation negated probable cause.
As noted in the preceding Section, reasonable mistakes do not
impair probable cause."' Consequently, even though the Carmichael
court considered the wrong issue first, it cannot be faulted for its
conclusion. The same cannot be said, however, of its treatment of
negligent misrepresentations. Without making even a half-hearted
effort to justify its position, the court asserts that it is too difficult to
determine "whether an officer was negligent or completely innocent
in not checking his facts further.""' Accordingly, the court holds that
negligent misrepresentations should not result in the suppression of
evidence even if the misrepresentation concerns a material matter. En
route to its conclusion, the court does not deal with probable cause
as a secondary consideration; rather, it ignores probable cause alto-
gether, thereby stripping the problem of its fourth amendment garb.
" 489 F.2d at 988-89 (emphasis added).
"P. 728 supra.
"P. 734 supra.
Iii 489 F.2d at 989.
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Had the court dealt with probable cause, it would not have been able
to resolve the matter by the unsupported assertion that the line be-
tween innocence and negligence is too fuzzy to be workable. Indeed,
given the fact that the court did consider the probable cause issue in
its discussion of innocent misrepresentations, it is fair to suggest that
the court ignored the issue in its discussion of negligence for the very
purpose of avoiding its impact.
The issue that the court ignored is whether the probable cause
process embodies a standard of reasonable care. More precisely, the
issue is whether a negligent misrepresentation may ever be said to
negate probable cause.
The Supreme Court's most thoughtful effort to define or de-
scribe probable cause was made in Brinegar v. United States:"8
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The stan-
dard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
"The substance of all the definitions" of probable cause "is a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt." McCarthy v. De Armit, 99
Pa. St. 63, 69, quoted with approval in the Carroll opinion. 267 U.S.
at 161. And this "means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation" or conviction, as Marshall, C.J., said for the Court
more than a century ago in Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339,
348. Since Marshall's time, at any rate, it has come to mean more
than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where "the facts and
circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that" an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162.
These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from
rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from un-
founded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection. Because many
situations which confront officers in the course of executing their
duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some
mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable
men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of proba-
bility. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical con-
ception affording the best compromise that has been found for ac-
ts 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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comodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would
unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave
law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice.",
This quotation leaves no doubt that, as a matter of judicial gloss, the
fourth amendment's requirement of probable cause embodies a stan-
dard of reasonableness.
As noted in Section IV (C) of this article, probable cause is a
process that comprises separate parts. The narrow issue in Brinegar
was whether, on the facts known to them, it was reasonable for
federal agents to infer that the defendant had committed a crime.12 1
Thus, the Court was concerned only with the inference-drawing part
of the process. In Carmichael, however, the court dealt not with the
inference-drawing part, but with the antecedent parts of acquiring
and transmitting information to the magistrate (the inference
drawer).21 When Brinegar and Carmichael are added together, the
awkward result is that integral parts of the same process are governed
by different standards of care: under Brinegar, inference drawing is
governed by a standard of reasonableness; under Carmichael, acquis-
ition and transmission are governed by a standard no lower than
recklessness. Given the equally crucial role that each part plays in the
process as a whole, governance by different standards is unprincipled.
From what has been developed in Section IV, 22 it is clear that, once
the Supreme Court establishes that a standard of reasonableness
governs any part of the process, the same standard must apply to all
parts. Carmichael is, therefore, wrong.
Although the Carmichael court ignored Brinegar, it was not
thereby compelled to adopt a standard of recklessness; after all, the
court could have adopted a standard of reasonableness even if
Brinegar had not been decided. It preferred not to do so, however,
asserting that ". . . no workable test suggests itself for determining
whether an officer was negligent or completely innocent in not check-
ing his facts further." 1 It is hard to take the court seriously for a
number of reasons.
First, the words "not checking his facts further" refer only to the
acquisition phase of the probable-cause process.124 They do not relate
to the transmission phase. Yet, it is the transmission phase that is
"' 338 U.S. at 175-76 (brackets in original) (emphasis added).
" 338 U.S. at 162-63, 165-70.
2 489 F.2d at 987.
"2 See text supra at notes 89 & 90.
M 489 F.2d at 989.
12 Indeed, the words refer only to a part of the acquisition phase.
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most often involved in sub-facial attacks. 2 Rarely does a sub-facial
attack involve the claim that an officer was negligent in not checking
his information further.121 Indeed, in Carmichael itself, all but one of
the defendant's claims involved the transmission phase. 27
Consequently, the court's assertion is of marginal relevance at best.
Second, although the court declined to draw the line between
innocence and negligence, it chose to draw it between negligence and
recklessness. Of the two, the negligence-recklessness line is probably
the fuzzier for the reason that recklessness comprehends culpability
that ranges widely from "gross" negligence to "wanton" miscon-
duct.128 Thus, the line drawn by the court clarifies nothing.
Third, the line between innocence and negligence is one that is
commonly drawn. In thousands upon thousands of lawsuits yearly,
juries determine the innocence or negligence of drivers, doctors, gov-
ernment executives, and even law enforcement officers. 2 1 If it is
workable for lay jurors to determine whether a police officer used
unreasonable force, surely it is workable for a judge to determine
whether an officer was negligent in acquiring or transmitting the
information used to invade someone's privacy.
Fourth, the result of the line drawn in Carmichael is to leave
unregulated a wide area of government misconduct. In our society,
government intrusion is a necessary evil-an exception to the right
to privacy. As an exception, it must be kept within narrow bounds
to protect innocent privacy. 3 ' That we tolerate non-negligent mis-
takes is already a compromise. To tolerate negligent (and, perhaps,
grossly negligent) errors would, in the words of Brinegar, "leave law-
abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."' 3'
The stance taken in Carmichael is unsupportable. Negligent mis-
representations, as well as those more culpable, should be within the
scope of a sub-facial attack. 32
"I United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58 (Ist Cir. 1974); United States v. Damitz, 495
F.2d 50 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Marihart, 492 F.2d 897 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 827 (1974); United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Harwood, 470 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1972).
"' Other than Carmichael, the only case I have found involving the claim that an officer
was negligent in not checking his information further is United States v. Henderson, 17 F.R.D.
I (D.D.C. 1954).
489 F.2d at 987.
'z See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 211-15 (1972).
"' Indeed, whether state executive officers are liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
may depend on "the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed. ... Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
" See supra, Section IV (A) & (B).
"' 338 U.S. at 176.
2 It may be argued that it is unfair to hold police officers (the administrators of the
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D. Materiality: A Problem of Fourth Amendment Perspectives
1. The Problem and its Case-Law Solution
Once it has been established that the source of an alleged misre-
presentation is a person whose knowledge or conduct may be drawn
into question by a sub-facial attack, and that the misrepresentation
was attended by culpability of the requisite degree, the misrepre-
sented information will be excised from the affidavit, and the deter-
mination of probable cause will be based on the allegations remain-
ing.' If those allegations are insufficient, a fourth amendment
violation has occurred. 134 Suppose, however, that the allegations are
sufficient. Carmichael holds that the evidence still must be suppressed
if-but only if-the misrepresentation was "deliberate."' 135 Another
recent case, United States v. Thomas,38 requires, as a predicate for
suppression, intention to deceive the magistrate.1 37 Both cases rely
on an article1 38 that urges the following rationale:
In every case an affiant's misstatement will either be material
to the finding of probable cause or it will be superfluous. In every
case, also, the affiant will have supplied the misstated allegation
either intentionally, negligently, or innocently. The easiest case for
suppression is a warrant based on an intentional misstatement by
an affiant-agent. This would be a clear case of proscribed govern-
ment action (perjury) which could be to some degree deterred by
acquisition and transmission phases of the probable-cause process) to the same standards
applicable to a magistrate (administrator of the inference-drawing phase). Police officers, after
all, have less training than magistrates and may have to make quick, on-the-spot judgments.
The argument, however, is fatally flawed.
First, in the wide variety of cases in which the police properly proceed without a warrant,
the officer draws the inferences, and is necessarily governed by a standard of reasonableness.
Indeed, this was the very situation that existed in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949).
Second, with reference to arrest warrants, the inference-drawing phase may constitution-
ally be entrusted to a court clerk, Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), who in all
likelihood has less training than a police officer.
Third, regardless of the above, if the government entrusts important parts of the probable-
cause process to non-lawyers without giving them adequate training, it is the government's
fault. The government should not be permitted to assert its own dereliction to defeat the
protection of innocent privacy. Cf L. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR
COURT 64-65 (1974).
'" United States v. Gonzalez, 488 F.2d 833, 838 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Up-
shaw, 448 F.2d 1218, 1221-22 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1972).
" United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322, 325 (10th Cir. 1972).
' 489 F.2d at 989.
' 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973).
"3 489 F.2d at 669.
' Kipperman, supra note 7.
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quashing warrants based thereupon. One could analogize inten-
tional inaccuracy by the affiant to the knowing use of perjured
testimony at trial and hold that the public policy against govern-
ment distortion requires automatic suppression of the evidence ob-
tained in such a manner regardless of prejudice. Thus an intentional
misstatement of fact in the affidavit would be fatal even if it were
immaterial to proving probable cause, or if, unbeknownst to the
lying affiant, the facts alleged in bad faith turned out to be true.
A more likely-and more difficult-case than intentional dis-
tortion is that of a negligent or unreasonable assertion in an affida-
vit, either (1) an assertion based on a negligent personal investiga-
tion by the affiant himself, (2) too forceful a claim of evidence of
reliability of a confidential informer, (3) reliance on a generally
trustworthy informer when the circumstances were such as to warn
the affiant to verify the information further "this time," or (4) a
negligent misstatement by the affiant of the informer's story. A rule
quashing all warrants where such negligence is shown requires, it
seems to me, too high a price in crime protection to be justified.
Exclusion of evidence only when procured by negligent misstate-
ments material to showing probable cause should prod police to
make prudent investigations about as well as would a full-scale
exclusionary rule, since the police will usually not know until they
apply for the warrant exactly which allegations will be critical. They
will therefore probably seek to gather as much untainted evidence
as possible to support the warrant against challenge. Allowing the
introduction of evidence when the affiant's negligence affects only
an immaterial allegation will save a number of otherwise unobjec-
tionable convictions without significantly restricting the deterrent
values of the rule. Therefore, courts need suppress evidence only
when obtained under a warrant which would not have issued but for
the negligent misstatement by the affiant 39
The most salient aspect of the proffered rationale is that it relies
on a goal of the exclusionary rule (deterrence) without asking whether
there was a violation of the fourth amendment in the first instance.
As noted earlier, this approach turns fourth amendment theory up-
side down. If the fourth amendment has not been violated by an
immaterial misrepresentation, it is unnecessary to inquire further.'
Of course, even without finding a violation of the fourth amendment,
a court might invoke either the due process clause or the doctrine of
supervisory powers to deal with the culpable, but immaterial, misre-
presentation. In the present context, however, neither doctrine makes
M Id. at 831-32 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
140 See text supra at note 115.
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much sense unless it is intended to protect the very values that under-
lie the fourth amendment. Thus, the question remains whether the
amendment was violated. 4'
2. Perspectives
The question may be approached from different perspectives
that may beget different results. In his brilliant essay on the fourth
amendment,' Professor Anthony Amsterdam asks
.. . whether the amendment should be viewed as a collection
of protections of atomistic spheres of interest of individual citizens
or as a regulation of governmental conduct. Does it safeguard my
person and your house and her papers and his effects against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures; or is it essentially a regulatory canon
requiring government to order its law enforcement procedures in a
fashion that keeps us collectively secure in our persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures?'
If we take an atomistic view, we are likely to conclude that the fourth
amendment is not violated by an immaterial misrepresentation-even
one that is deliberate or made with purpose to deceive the magistrate.
The very immateriality of the misrepresentation means that it could
have played no role in the magistrate's decision to authorize intrusive
action. As long as that decision was fully supported by the rest of the
information conveyed to the magistrate, the defendant has nothing
to complain about, for the intrusion was justified.'44
If we take a regulatory view, however, we might well hold that
the fourth amendment is violated by any misrepresentation that is
culpable-even one that is immaterial and only negligent. While
seeking the authority to take intrusive action, the officer (a function-
ary of the probable-cause process) culpably misrepresented informa-
tion to the magistrate (another functionary of the process). Although
the culpable misrepresentation did not negate probable cause in this
case, it nevertheless put innocent privacy to risk. If courts ignore
culpable, but immaterial, misrepresentations, they will thereby in-
duce or encourage other misrepresentations some of which will be
" Mr. Kipperman's analogies to perjury are not persuasive. The criminal law of perjury
ordinarily requires materiality as an element of liability, R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 461-63
(2d ed. 1969), and cases involving the knowing use of false evidence do not ignore the bearing
that the evidence might have had on the outcome of the case. E.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. I
(1967). Cf. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
" Supra note 18.
" Id. at 367 (emphasis on possessive pronouns in original; other emphasis added).
" E.g., United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 1973).
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material and will negate probable cause. Given the limitations of the
warrant-issuing process, the magistrate will not be able to detect
these misrepresentations.'45 As a result, he will issue some warrants
without probable cause, and innocent privacy will be needlessly in-
fringed, contrary to the central purpose of the fourth amendment.,
However, if courts do not ignore culpable, but immaterial, misrepre-
sentations, they will remove the inducement'47 by conveying to the
functionaries of the probable-cause process the strong signal that
tomorrow's case is as important as today's; that innocent privacy is
the desideratum; and that is subverted by any maladministration of
the process whether it is deliberate, or merely negligent, or any shade
in between.
Under an atomistic view of the fourth amendment, Carmichael
and Thomas go too far by excluding evidence when the misrepresen-
tation, although deliberate or fraudulent, was immaterial. Under a
regulatory view, they do not go far enough, for they reject the exclu-
sionary sanction when the misrepresentation, although immaterial,
was reckless or negligent. In result, the cases are neither fish nor fowl,
being partly atomistic, partly regulatory. They are unsatisfactory for
another reason as well; in neither case did the court even indicate an
awareness that the basic problem was one of choosing a fourth
amendment philosophy. That is not surprising, however. As Profes-
sor Amsterdam has observed, the Supreme Court itself has never
directly addressed the choice between atomistic and regulatory
perspectives.14 Yet, many of its decisions-cases dealing with stand-
ing and attenuation, for example-can be explained only on the basis
of an unquestioned, but barely articulated, acceptance of the atomis-
tic view.'
Professor Amsterdam criticizes the atomistic view as disserving
collective or innocent privacy by focussing too narrowly on the adven-
titious aspects of particular cases. 5 " As an example, he poses a situa-
tion in which officers, having neither probable cause nor a warrant,
break into a hotel room because they suspect that the occupants have
robbed a bank. Unknown to the police, however, the occupants have
45 See text supra at notes II et seq.
' See text supra at notes 63-68.
IA On the use of the exclusionary rule to remove inducements, see Amsterdam, supra note
18, at 432.
" Id. at 367.
I4' d. See id. at 433. On the other hand, some of the cases in which the court has insisted
on search warrants seem to have a regulatory focus. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
766 n.12 (1969).
11 Supra note 18 at 367-69, 438-39.
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already abandoned the room, leaving behind incriminating evi-
dence. '5 Under an atomistic view, there was no fourth amendment
violation. The occupants, having abandoned the room, had no consti-
tutionally protected interest in it at the time of the entry. Thus, the
entry was proper even though the police believed the room was occu-
pied and engaged in conduct that strikes at the very heart of fourth
amendment values.5 2 Surely, Professor Amsterdam is right when he
says that the police have to be taught now, in this case, regardless of
the fortuity of abandonment, that they cannot continue such con-
duct.' Under a regulatory view, that lesson would be taught. 54
But the regulatory view is not without its imperfections. Sup-
pose, as a variation of Professor Amsterdam's case, that the officers
reasonably, but erroneously, believed that the room was abandoned,
entered it with the consent of the desk clerk, and found the robbers
counting their loot. Under a regulatory view, it might be argued that
the police conduct was proper even though the defendants' privacy
was invaded without a warrant or probable cause. Under an atomistic
view, however, that argument would be insupportable.
The fourth amendment is a rough guide to proper and improper
police conduct. In common with other guides, it ought to be consulted
before the trip begins, not after the trip is over. To be understandable,
its rules ought to be fairly simple and straightforward, and not quali-
fied by too many or too fine exceptions. The overarching concern of
the fourth amendment is to keep the risk of invading innocent privacy
tolerably low. 55 If the police want to enter and search a hotel
room-an enclave that has been, may be (perhaps is still being), and
certainly will be used to shield the occupants from the world outside,
they should be required to have probable cause and a warrant. I am
not saying that the requirements should be imposed in every case;
exceptions are inevitable. But I am saying that the outcome of differ-
ent cases should not hinge on whether a police officer correctly or
incorrectly believed that the room was occupied or abandoned.
If cases are not to turn on such distinctions, however, it will be
necessary to take the position that the atomistic and regulatory views
are not mutually exclusive alternatives, but partners in the protection
of privacy. If, on either view, the police conduct was improper, the
M Id. at 368.
152 Id.
M Id. at 368-69.
151 Id. at 369.
I' See text supra at notes 63-68.
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exclusionary sanction should follow. 5' What I am suggesting may, at
first impression, seem like a heads-I-win, tails-you-lose perspective of
the fourth amendment, but it is not. Although the combination of
both views is a device for maximally safeguarding innocent privacy
from needless impingement, it is not a strategem for prohibiting all
intrusive action or strangling law enforcement. Even under a com-
bined or integrated theory, it will be necessary for courts to determine
whether the police conduct passed the threshold of risk to innocent
privacy or constituted a needless impingement; and there is no reason
to believe that all or even most of the decisions will favor the defen-
dant.
If one takes an atomistic-regulatory view of the fourth amend-
ment, it is clear that Carmichael and Thomas inadequately deal with
the problem of immaterial misrepresentations by distinguishing
among kinds of culpability instead of stressing the fact of culpability
and the needless risk to innocent privacy. Both courts should have
invoked the exclusionary rule to rid the probable-cause process of the
potential effects of any culpable misrepresentation, regardless of
immateriality in the particular case. '57
E. The Requirement of a Preliminary Showing
Up to this point, I have been concerned with the scope of a rule
permitting sub-facial attacks. Now I want to address a major proce-
dural problem. Many of the courts that permit sub-facial attacks
'1 The blending of atomistic and regulatory perspectives has already been suggested in the
related context of standards for determining whether a confession is voluntary. Kamisar, What
is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's "Criminal Interroga-
tion and Confessions," 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728, 753 (1963).
"' But see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 533 (1964):
The factual inaccuracies depended upon by petitioner to destroy probable
cause-i.e., the allegations in the affidavit that petitioner was the manager of Rugen-
dorf Brothers Meat Market and that he was associated with his brother Leo in the
meat business-were only of peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause,
and, not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not go to the integrity
of the affidavit.
As indicated in note 100 supra, however, Rugendorfcannot fairly be regarded as dispositive of
any of the issues discussed in this article.
The discussion of materiality in the text above has assumed that the source affirmatively
represents as true that which is not. There is, however, another context in which the materiality
issue may arise: the source may convey less than all of the information he possesses. Whether
an omission to include information violates the fourth amendment should turn on whether a
prudent or reasonably cautious person would have omitted the same information. In answering
the latter question, however, it does seem appropriate to consider the materiality of the omitted
information. If information is clearly immaterial, there is no reason to transmit it. Any other
rule would make the drafting of affidavits intolerable.
WARRANTS
force the defendant to jump a preliminary hurdle. They refuse to give
the defendant a hearing unless he makes a preliminary showing that
the hearing may be fruitful.' The requirement ranges in stringency
from ". . . some initial showing of some sort-some suggestion of a
basis or area of doubt . . . ."I" to "a showing of falsity of allega-
tion-a showing presumably not easily to be made in most cases."' 60
As codified by the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, the
requirement is as follows:
The moving party shall be allowed to make the contest...
only upon preliminary motion, supported by affidavit, setting forth
substantial basis for questioning the good faith of the testimony,
and such party shall have the burden of proving the lack of good
faith."'
By contrast, neither in the cases nor in the Model Code is a similar
requirement imposed upon the defendant who wants to attack the
factual basis of action taken without a warrant.8 2 Is the requirement
justifiable?
In only one of the cases that impose the requirement is an effort
made to articulate a rationale. In United States v. Halsey,'63 the
court said:
It is not only because "[r]esponsibility is the great developer
of men"-or even because he is the real point of protection-that
the Commissioner's independent judgment merits a substantial
measure of finality. On a less lofty but eminently practical level,
there is the fact that the work must be divided and get done...
In ruling against such a right [to make a sub-facial attack
without a preliminary showing], we strike a reasonable balance
between prudence and the ideal. The question, after all, is not as to
guilt or innocence, and it does not diminish the value of privacy to
acknowledge this. . . .To face pertinent facts, the issue as we have
it arises only because the search proved fruitful. And while this, on
familiar ground, could not validate a lawless search . . . it serves
as at least some assurance that the price of refusing to retrace the
Commissioner's steps in every case is not excessive.'64
Im E.g., United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Carmi-
chael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
"I' United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
'" United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58, 63 (lst Cir. 1974).
"' Section SS 290.3(l)(b).
UZ See Section SS 290.3(2).
"1 257 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
I" Id. at 1006 (footnotes omitted).
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At least four arguments may be extracted from this statement.
The first two are related. They are that entertaining sub-facial attacks
without requiring a preliminary showing of merit would destroy the
warrant-issuer's sense of responsibility, and that the protection af-
forded fourth amendment values by the warrant-issuer makes sub-
facial attacks generally unnecessary. Both arguments have also been
advanced as reasons for prohibiting any sub-facial attack. In that
context, they were considered earlier and found transparently inade-
quate.65 They are no more valid here.
The third and fourth arguments are also related. They are that
routine attacks would impede the disposition of cases, and that, on
balance, this cost outweighs the benefits to privacy that flow from the
exclusionary rule--'benefits, it should be added, that inure to the
guilty. These arguments, too, have been urged in bar of sub-facial
attacks.'66 Implicit in them is a perspective of the fourth amendment
and the probable-cause process that is neither atomistic nor regula-
tory, but myopic.
In striking a balance, the Halsey court had its thumb on the
scale. Although it gave full weight to judicial efficiency, it gave short
weight to the probable-cause process. Nowhere in the opinion does
the court discuss the effect on privacy of requiring a preliminary
showing. What is the effect likely to be?
To answer that question it is necessary to ask another: what
procedures will govern the requirement of a preliminary showing? No
procedures have been established in the reported cases. The Model
Code, however, does set out a general procedure which will probably
be influential. The model procedure requires the defendant to file a
motion "supported by affidavit, setting forth substantial basis" for
making the sub-facial attack." 7 According to the Code's commen-
tary, the affidavit must contain a "substantial suggestion that the
evidence on probable cause should not be credited."' 68 The purpose
of the requirement is to discourage frivolous attacks.'69
Who will file the affidavit and on what will it be based? In some
cases, the affidavit will be filed by the defendant, defense lawyer, or
other persons who have information that contradicts the allegations
of the warrant affidavit. But such cases will be rare. In the vast
"I See Section II supra.
166 Id.
"e Supra note 161.
IIS MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 571 (Prop. Off. Draft, April 15,
1975) (Commentary).
166 Id.
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majority of cases, a sub-facial attack is intended to demonstrate that
the affiant misrepresented either the information conveyed by an
informant or the informant's reliability.170 That demonstration, how-
ever, cannot feasibly be made without conducting a "fishing" interro-
gation of the informant or affiant. Under McCray,7 1 the informant's
identity need not be disclosed. Even if the informant's identity is
known, however, it is unlikely that either the informant or the affiant
will submit to an interview voluntarily, and compulsory process is
generally unavailable.' As a result, a procedural rule requiring a
preliminary showing of merit will, in the vast majority of cases, have
the same effect as a substantive rule barring all sub-facial attacks.
The substantive rule endangers innocent privacy by allowing the
maladministration of the probable-cause process to escape judicial
scrutiny and control. It is, as I have argued in Section IV, unconsti-
tutional. So also is its procedural analogue as fashioned in Halsey
and the Model Code.
Declarations of unconstitutionality have their consequences, too.
If sub-facial attacks are routinely entertained, some of them will
prove frivolous and time-wasting. In civil practice, a motion for sum-
mary judgment is used to screen out the frivolous, but well-pleaded,
case.7 3 A similar technique could be used in criminal cases if discov-
ery depositions were available. The defense lawyer would then have
the opportunity to compel the out-of-court interrogation of a known
informant or affiant, and requiring a preliminary showing would
therefore have little impact. But discovery depositions are not gener-
ally available in criminal cases at the present time. 7 1 Until they are,
the system will have to suffer the effects of its own nearsightedness
by giving plenary treatment to the frivolous as well as the merito-
rious. The one course that is not open is to throw out the meritorious
with the frivolous.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two fundamental judgments underlie the fourth amendment:
that free people have a right to be free from unnecessary, or unneces-
110 E.g., United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v.
Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 666 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 987
(7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322, 324 (10th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1972).
" McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
2 Most jurisdictions do not permit discovery depositions in criminal cases. Y. KAMISAR,
W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1237-38 (1974).
m See 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2057 (2d ed. 1975).
" Supra note 172.
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sarily broad, intrusion by the functionaries of government, and that
officially authorized intruders cannot be trusted to restrain them-
selves to intrude with necessity and then only narrowly.175 The two
judgments are embodied in the two clauses of the fourth amendment.
The first clause creates or recognizes the "right of the people." The
second imposes restrictions on officially authorized intruders in order
to protect innocent privacy from needless impingement. Extraordi-
nary cases aside, the restrictions are probable cause, particularity and
warrants. The requirement of probable cause is implemented by a
multifaceted process. In a case involving a warrant, the process has
three parts: acquisition of information, transmission to a magistrate,
and evaluation by the magistrate. Each part, no less than the others,
plays a vital role in serving fourth amendment goals.
Facial attacks-the validity of which has never been ques-
tioned-assert the malfunctioning of the evaluation part. Sub-facial
attacks implicate the other parts, primarily transmission. Given the
equally crucial role played by each part, sub-facial attacks should, as
a matter of fourth amendment law, be permitted without restriction,
for they go to the very heart of the protection of privacy. Prohibiting
sub-facial attacks or imposing restrictions that are functionally equiv-
alent to prohibition "reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of
words."'
115 See Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 432-33. The historical basis for the judgments is
traced in N. LASSoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13-78 (1937).
"I Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
